Which Can Exercise Both Original and Appellate Jurisdiction?

Article III, Section 2, Clause 2:

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Courtroom shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall brand.

Implicit in the argument of Marbury v. Madison 1 is the idea that the Court is obligated to have and decide cases coming together jurisdictional standards. Chief Justice Marshall spelled this out in Cohens v. Virginia :2 "It is well-nigh true that this Courtroom will not take jurisdiction if information technology should not: only information technology is equally truthful, that information technology must have jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a mensurate because it approaches the confines of the constitution. Nosotros cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, nosotros must make up one's mind it, if it be brought before usa. We take no more than right to pass up the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution." As the annotate recognizes, considering judicial review grows out of the fiction that courts but declare what the law is in specific cases3 and are without will or discretion,iv its exercise is surrounded by the inherent limitations of the judicial process, about basically, of course, by the necessity of a case or controversy and the strands of the doctrine comprising the concept of justiciability.5 Only, although at that place are hints of Chief Justice Marshall'south activism in some mod cases,6 the Court has e'er adhered, at times more strictly than at other times, to several discretionary rules or concepts of restraint in the exercise of judicial review, the practice of which is very much opposite to the quoted dicta from Cohens . These rules, it should be noted, are in addition to the vast discretionary power which the Supreme Court has to grant or deny review of judgments in lower courts, a discretion fully authorized with certiorari jurisdiction but in effect in practice likewise with regard to what remains of appeals.7 -1257. See F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra at ch. vii. "The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court decisions. In virtually all cases within the Court'south appellate jurisdiction, the petitioner has already received one appellate review of his example . . . . If we took every instance in which an interesting legal question is raised, or our prima facie impression is that the determination beneath is erroneous, nosotros could non fulfill the Constitutional and statutory responsibilities placed upon the Court. To remain effective, the Supreme Courtroom must continue to make up one's mind only those cases which present questions whose resolution will take immediate importance far beyond the item facts and parties involved." Principal Justice Vinson, Accost on the Work of the Federal Courtroom, in 69 Sup. Ct. v, 6. It "is only accurate to a caste to say that our jurisdiction in cases on appeal is obligatory equally distinguished from discretionary on certiorari." Chief Justice Warren, quoted in , The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 Harv. L. Rev. twenty, 51 (1954).

At various times, the Court has followed more strictly than other times the prudential theorems for avoidance of decisionmaking when information technology deemed restraint to exist more desirable than activism.viii

Footnotes

1

v U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).

two

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404, (1821).

iii

See, e.g., Justice Sutherland in Adkins v. Children's Infirmary, 261 U.Due south. 525, 544 (1923), and Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).

4

"Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the powers of the law, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and tin will zero." Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (Chief Justice Marshall). Encounter too Justice Roberts in U.s. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62–63 (1936).

5

The political question doctrine is another limitation arising in role out of inherent restrictions and in part from prudential considerations. For a word of limitations utilizing both stands, run across Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346–56 (1936) (Justice Brandeis concurring).

6

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548–49 (1969); Baker five. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.Due south. 241, 248 (1967).

seven

28 U.Southward.C. §§ 1254-1257. See F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra at ch. seven. "The Supreme Courtroom is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower court decisions. In almost all cases within the Courtroom's appellate jurisdiction, the petitioner has already received one appellate review of his case . . . . If we took every instance in which an interesting legal question is raised, or our prima facie impression is that the conclusion below is erroneous, we could non fulfill the Constitutional and statutory responsibilities placed upon the Courtroom. To remain constructive, the Supreme Court must go along to decide only those cases which present questions whose resolution volition have immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Chief Justice Vinson, Address on the Piece of work of the Federal Court, in 69 Sup. Ct. v, half dozen. It "is only accurate to a caste to say that our jurisdiction in cases on appeal is obligatory every bit distinguished from discretionary on certiorari." Master Justice Warren, quoted in Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 Harv. 50. Rev. 20, 51 (1954).

8

See Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936). And contrast A. Bickel, supra at 111-198, with Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" : A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. 50. Rev. 1 (1964).

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Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/clause-2/appellate-jurisdiction

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